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RESUME 
Alors que dans de nombreuses industries la prise de décisions est fondée sur une 
analyse des risques, cette pratique reste exceptionnelle en assainissement. Dans ce 
domaine, il est courant de prendre des décisions intuitives en impliquant seulement 
quelques employés clés possédant une connaissance des systèmes. Cette étude 
montre que l'analyse des risques ainsi que l'analyse coût-bénéfice apportent une 
base solide pour la prise de décisions dans le secteur de l'assainissement. Cela est 
principalement du au fait que ces méthodes permettent de comparer des aspects 
différents du réseau d'assainissement. Copenhagen Energy, la société responsable 
des égouts de Copenhague, effectue actuellement une analyse des risques dans les 
réseaux d'assainissment. 
ABSTRACT 
While it is common practice to make decisions on the basis of risk assessment in 
many technical industries, it remains exceptional in the urban drainage industry. Here 
it has been established practice to make decisions on an ordinary commonsense 
basis, with key personnel with systems knowledge involved. This study shows that 
the inclusion of risk assessment and cost benefit analyses provides a solid basis for 
decision-making in the sewer sector. This is primarily because these methods allow 
for the various considerations of a drainage system to be viewed comparatively. 
Copenhagen Energy, who is responsible for Copenhagen’s sewer system, is currently 
carrying out a wider risk assessment of the sewer system. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment is a tool for analysing the risk of system failure in a rational way, 
which allows for the prioritisation of resources in reducing said risks consciously and 
pro-actively. While risk assessment has been commonly used in a wide variety of 
technical industries in recent years, it has yet to find its way into the sewage sector, 
despite these methods appearing well suited to operational and planning type goals.  
The conceptual principles underlying risk assessment are intuitively employed every 
time a decision is made in the sewer sector. This occurs via subjective evaluations, 
taking the form of ”gut feelings” or ”rules of thumb”. It is, however, exceptional for 
decisions to be made on a systematic and documented basis where various 
considerations are weighed up in relation to each other.  A drainage system is based 
on a given financial budget, within which all the different requirements have to be met. 
It is, therefore, of decisive importance that the available resources are used in the 
most efficient way. 
But how are decisions to be made when it comes to allocating funds for the various 
considerations that the leadership of an urban drainage system are responsible for ? 
Considerations that include, for example, employee safety, basement flooding, 
compliance with bathing water regulations, the public image of the sewer system, 
customer service, reliability, protection of recipients in accordance with the Water 
Frame Directive, disease prevention, maintenance of sewer system, countering the 
greenhouse effect and so on. This is when the pressing need for a risk assessment 
combined with a cost benefit analysis comes into the picture.  
2 THE STUDY AREA 
This study is a pilot project, and the first of its kind, in the use of risk assessment in 
the sewer management in Denmark and, as far as we know, in the EU.  The pilot 
project has been carried out in cooperation with Copenhagen Energy, which runs 
Copenhagen Council’s sewer system. The sewer system covers a 9000 hectares 
large area of Copenhagen. The sewer system serves around 500,000 inhabitants.  
The total length of all the sewer pipes in the system is approximately 1200 kilometres 
with around 35,000 service pipes, 20,000 street drains, more than 100 technical 
stations, and 120 outlets to recipients. There are furthermore connected a large 
amount of highly sensitive users, including nursing homes, public institutions, 
hospitals and companies.  
It is not the intention to carry out a full, detailed risk assessment for the whole area as 
that would require a very high level of resources. Rather, a screening of the system 
is undertaken, where selected localities are picked out for closer analysis. Screening 
is a dynamic process, which is undertaken on an ongoing basis. To carry out the most 
proficient screening, experts with particular knowledge of the sewer system are called 
in to a series of meetings, where experiences and general operational data are 
presented in a structured way. Specialised investigative tools developed for aiding 
risk assessment, such as HAZOP, are employed. This is of key importance as it 
allows for employees from all levels to be included in the process.  
3 METHODS AND APPROACHES 
Figure 1 shows the procedural outline followed in risk assessment.  With the 
assistance of the experts’ knowledge, the most important localities are first selected 
for closer analysis, which set the parameters for the project. The next stage involves 
the presentation of the data necessary for forming an initial rough risk assessment, 
which allows for the screening of the most significant risks for the particular 
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installation. From this is produced a series of unacceptable critical relations and a 
further evaluation of risk-reducing measures, which can prevent the unacceptable 
risks. There can also arise a need to carry out a more detailed risk assessment for 
certain installations, before suggestions can be made regarding risk-reducing 
measures.  
 
Figure 1 : Procedural outline followed in risk assessment  
The process is dynamic and involves the continual introduction of new knowledge to 
the presentation of the data in the risk assessment. This can have the consequence 
of either highlighting new localities as risk areas, or of excluding others, which do not, 
upon closer examination, represent after all an unacceptable risk. Localities should be 
chosen on the probability of a problem occurring and the extent of the outcomes 
related to that. The chosen localities, which have an unacceptably high level of risk, 
will then be analysed further with the aim of identifying risk-reducing measures. These 
measures will aim to reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level at the cheapest 
possible cost.  
4 THE COST-BENEFIT-RISK CONCEPTS 
4.1 Defining risk 
Mathematically, risk is defined as its probability multiplied by the consequences of 
any given undesired event. The primary goal of risk assessment is to identify and 
quantify undesired events which may occur and the losses or outcomes that they lead 
to. A risk assessment is made up of the five following levels: 
1. What can go wrong? 2. How probable is it and what are the likely consequences? 
3. How can the situation be improved? 4. What is the economic cost and what are the 
economic and benefits of the improvement? 5. Which risk-reducing measures should 
be set in motion? 
4.2 HAZOP 
HAZOP stands for HAZard and OPerability in association and is made up of several 
steps, as shown in Figure 2. The HAZOP methodology is a qualitative risk 
assessment, whose goal is to disclose types of error and their consequences, which 
can occur in an existing  system as well as changes to that system. The method is 
based on brainstorming in meetings, and is established as a powerful and well-
structured analytic tool. See Kletz (1992) or Henley and Kumamoto (1992) for further 
details. 
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Figure 2 : HAZOP method. 
4.3 Defining risk matrixes 
As there can be found many different types of risk and consequences, it is necessary 
to define 2 matrices: a frequency and a consequence matrix. 
4.3.1 Frequency matrix 
One example of a frequency matrix is shown in Figure 3. The matrix expresses how 
often any given undesired event occurs.  The frequency is partly given by a qualitative 
scale going from “very frequently” to “extremely rare”, and partly by a quantitative 
scale, which roughly describes the frequency and repetition periods for an event as a 
numeric value.  It is important that both the qualitative scale and the quantitative scale 
are defined in a way that attains a broad agreement around the concepts.  It should 
be noted that the quantitative scale is logarithmic.  
 
Figure 3 : Frequency matrix. 
4.3.2 Consequence matrix 
Figure 4 shows an example of a consequence matrix. In order to create a common 
scale for different types of consequences, it is necessary to group these in a matrix.  
Just as with the frequency matrix, the consequence matrix is expressed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative scale runs in gradated steps from 
“nothing/negligible” to “very serious”. The quantitative scale is an economic scale, 
which can be seen at the bottom of the matrix. All consequences can be quantified 
economically, that is the definition of risk as an anticipated loss. This applies also to 
what can be termed “softer values”, such as, for example, nature, working conditions 
and so on. As with the frequency matrix, this is also assembled as a logarithmic 
scale. It is important to underline that the vast majority of figures in the consequence 
matrix are not arbitrarily set, but derive from previous experience and the general 
practice of risk assessment.  
 
Figure 4 : Example of a consequence matrix 
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4.3.3 Risk matrix 
Figure 5 shows an example of a risk matrix, in which the risk level varies between 
whole digit values from 0 to 10. The risk matrix consists of a vertical measure of the 
frequency groups and an horizontal measure of the consequence groups. As we are 
using a double logarithmic matrix, the level of risk on all straight lines is identical with 
an inclination of -1. This means that an undesired event that has a frequency of “very 
often” and a consequence of “marginal” has the same risk level as an event with the 
frequency of “probable” and the consequence of “very serious”, (which is registered 
as level 7). It should be noted that, because the risk matrix is double logarithmic, the 
frequency number and the consequence number should be added rather than 
multiplied, as the definition of risk actually is measured as  
(risk = probability*consequence). 
 
Figure 5 : Example of a risk matrix 
Every undesired event, such as a broken pipe for example, (represented by the large 
dot in the risk matrix), has a series of unintended effects with specific frequencies and 
consequences. These could entail overflow to recipients, basement flooding, risk of 
infection, material damage and so on. The specific risks of the effects resulting from 
the event are represented in the figure by the smaller dots, which are summarised in 
Formula 1, below. This formula gives the combined risk as it is represented by the 






R     (Formula 1) 
, where Ri stands for the single partial risk dot and Rsamlet is the combined risk level for 
the undesired event.  
Utilising the risk matrix, the various events can be systematically ranked on a 
comparative basis, that is to say the risk of failure of system components such as 
pump stations, broken pipes, reservoirs and so on, can be directly compared with 
each other. Risk assessment thus opens up the possibility for investing in those 
localities where risk can be maximally reduced for any given investment.  
4.3.4 ALARP 
ALARP is a band in the risk matrix, which expresses the acceptable risk level for the 
individual drainage system. ALARP stands for As Low As Reasonably Practicable.  Its 
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position in the matrix is governed by the urban drainage system’s economic 
resources. If this band is, for example, pushed towards 5 or 6, events whose risk is 
higher should be brought down. This is done via risk-reducing measures.  
4.4 Bayesian Networks 
The described calculation of the risk is based on a rather rough assessment of the 
probability and consequence of specific incidents. Actual modeling, which is able to 
disclose complicated causal relations in the sewer system, has also been applied – 
based on Bayesian networks see Jensen (2001), Friis-Hansen (2004) This is 
performed by means of a graphic model – Hugin , (www.hugin.com) – which is built 
up by means of nodes, describing an uncertain quantity by a set of possible 
conditions, (stochastic modeling). These nodes are connected internally and the 
connections describe the interdependence between the nodes. In order to calculate 
the risk, it is necessary to describe a probability distribution for all the nodes, and 
these are quantified based on qualified technical knowledge of the sewer system 
design, current condition and function. 
When the network has been fully modeled and the incoming probability distribution 
has been specified, the probability distribution for the total consequences can be 
calculated. This is in itself interesting, as it is possible – on the basis of this 
distribution – to calculate the risk. However, this is far from the only possibility. The 
Bayesian network can also be applied for identification of inferences, when part of the 
network has to be in a specific mode, e.g. in the case of modifications or 
maintenance. 
By extending the network to include cost and decision nodes, the most cost-effective 
decisions can easily be identified. A decision node could for example describe the 
degree of maintenance or modification that could be performed in a given pipeline or 
in a given area. A cost node would describe the costs involved based on the 
assessment of the potential reduction of frequency and/or consequence. 
4.5 Cost benefit analysis 
For high risk elements, technical measures are established to reduce the risk, and the 
effect of the risk-reducing is assessed by means of a new risk calculation including 
the effect of the risk-reducing measures. The risk reduction is called dR and is 
expressed as the annual saving obtained through the reduction of the risk level. Also, 
the finances involved, (capital costs and operating costs), for implementation of the 
risk reducing measures is set up, and is converted into an annual cost called dC, 
applying the cost benefit approach. , see e.g. Friis-Hansen (2002).The ratio between 
dC/dR expresses whether it is profitable to reduce the risk for the elements in 
question. If the ratio dC/dR is less than 1, the risk-reducing measure will be a good 
investment and vice versa. 
5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Preliminary risk screening 
The initial risk screening of the sewer system and its components allowed for the 
selection of 23 localities with a possible high risk level, some of them shown in Figure 
6. The selected localities with a possible unacceptably high level of risk have to be 
analysed more closely in order to identify the precise risk level and if this level is to 
high, possible risk-reducing measures, which can bring down the risk level to an 
acceptable level.  
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Figure 6 : Mapping of selected possible high risk localities. 
5.2 Pipe connection to the Klovermarks pumping station 
As an illustration of the use of risk assessment by Copenhagen’s Energy, we will look 
more closely at point 1 on the map (figure 6). 
5.2.1 Details about the pipe connection 
The pipe connection to the Klovermarks pump station was established in 1903. The 
pipe drains a large sewered area to Klovermark’s pumping station, which then pumps 
the water on to the Treatment Plant, Lynetten. Apart from the 903 metres of combined 
stretches of pipe, there is a length of approx. 270 metres lying under the water. A 
break in this pipe will cause extensive overflow into the harbour area in the space of a 
very short time.  Dry weather flow varies between 200 l/s and 600 l/s throughout the 
day.  
5.2.2 Rough Risk Analysis 
A broken pipe has been analysed using a rough form of risk assessment, utilising the 
frequency, consequence and risk matrices that have been developed. Significant 
consequences are introduced into the assessment as follows: Material damage, (CE’s 
own material); environmental impact; bathing water quality and sickness/injury 
amongst both CE’s employees and the employees of the subcontractors involved in 
the clean-up. The combined risk level for this broken pipe is calculated to 6.6, which 
corresponds to an economic loss of 4.2 million DKK per year. The level of risk is 
above the ALARP, which CE has defined. Risk-reducing measures should, therefore, 
be set in motion to bring down the risk level to an acceptable level for CE.  
5.2.3 Risk reducing initiatives 
In order to carry out a more detailed assessment of risk, the pipe was divided into five 
separate stretches. This revealed that both events designated as “highly reduced 
flow” and “reduced flow” led to a high risk categorisation, events which were caused 
either by a break or blockage of the pipes. The frequencies of these events were 
established as between 3 and 4, which corresponded to occurring between once 
every 10 to 100 years and 100 to 1000 years.  Realistic measures to reduce the 
frequency risk were, however, not identified. The reduction of the frequency risk 
would only be made possible by the replacement or supplementation of the existing 
pipes.  A reduction of the risk level, however, could occur by reducing the 
consequences of an event. A detailed risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis 
showed that by far the most effective reduction of risk would be achieved by a 
reinforcement of the dry weather flow in comparison to reinforcing the full capacity in 
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the case of rain. Risk reduction can take place in two ways, either through the storage 
of water or through relocating it while the repair work is carried out.  It was shown that 
the storage of water was a totally unrealistic strategy as the dry weather flow alone is 
the magnitude of 400 l/s, which amounts to around 35,000 cubic metres per day. The 
repair time is estimated at 3-4 weeks. Therefore the relocation of the water in the 
system is the preferred option while repairs take place. In this way, 7 proposals could 
be devised for risk-reducing measures.  These can be divided into 3 categories: 
installation type improvements; transportable improvements; and a rapid response 
strategy. Installation type improvements apply to the permanent situating of pipes, so 
securing a separate pathway for the dry weather flow from the pump station. A 
transportable improvement has to be ready at short notice to pump the water around 
the point of breakage until the break is repaired. The rapid response strategy involves 
pumping water using existing or rented equipment. These 7 different initiatives were 
then exposed to a cost-benefit analysis and the results can be seen in Figure 7.  Here 
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Figure 7 : dC/dR ratios for 7 different risk reducing initiatives 
5.3 Conclusion 
This study has shown that the cost-benefit risk concept has a lot to offer as a 
decision-making tool, arming management within the urban drainage sector with the 
ability to take clear, rational, well-considered decisions. Until now most decisions 
have been taken on the basis of “gut feelings”, involving only few key personnel, as 
the economic impact of, for example, personal injury, damage to material, 
environmental harm and so on were taken in to consideration later in the process. 
Copenhagen’s Energy currently utilises the Asset Management tool in order to 
establish future investment requirements and priorities for the Copenhagen 
municipality. Risk assessment constitutes a vital aid to Asset Management and could, 
therefore significantly contribute to the optimization of the future investment profile for 
Copenhagen Energy.  
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